Answering Moral Skepticism
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Answering Moral Skepticism
Kagan, Shelly
Oxford University Press Inc
02/2024
416
Dura
Inglês
9780197688977
15 a 20 dias
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Acknowledgments
A Note to the Reader
Introduction
1. What Would Morality Need to Be?
1.1 Job Descriptions
1.2 Possible Elements
1.3 Satisfying the Job Description
2. Basic Positions in Metaethics
2.1 Cognitivism vs. Noncognitivism
2.2 Nihilism vs. Moral Realism
2.3 Varieties of Moral Realism
2.4 Moral Skepticism
3. Nihilism
3.1 The Nature of Nihilism
3.2 The Case for Nihilism
3.3 Disregarding the Arguments
3.4 Normative Nihilism
4. Noncognitivism
4.1 The Nature of Noncognitivism
4.2 The Case for Noncognitivism
4.3 Objections to Noncognitivism
5. Disagreement
5.1 The Argument from Disagreement
5.2 The Implications of Disagreement
5.3 Explaining Moral Disagreement
5.4 Nonconvergence
6. Relativism
6.1 Moral Relativism
6.2 Clarifying Relativism
6.3 Arguing for Relativism
6.4 Relativized Foundational Theories
7. Knowledge
7.1 The Analogy to Observation
7.2 Appearances
7.3 Dismissing Moral Intuitions
7.4 Reliability
7.5 Intuitionism
8. Evolution
8.1 The Argument from Evolution
8.2 A Second Try
8.3 Truth and Advantage in Ethics
8.4 Common Ground
8.5 The Continuity Problem
8.6 Path Dependence
9. Explanation
9.1 A Metaphysical Test
9.2 Explaining Empirical Facts
9.3 Reduction and Explanation
9.4 The Normative Aspect of Moral Facts
9.5 The Unrestricted Test
10. Motivation
10.1 Motive Internalism
10.2 An Argument for Noncognitivism
10.3 Rejecting Motive Internalism
10.4 Rejecting the Humean Theory of Motivation
10.5 The Direction of Fit
11. Reasons
11.1 Reasons Internalism
11.2 Reasons
11.3 Refining the Argument
11.4 Hypothetical Reasons
11.5 Rational Support
11.6 Categorical Reasons and Motivation
12. Reductionism
12.1 The Appeal of Reductionism
12.2 The Nature of Reduction
12.3 The Open Question Argument
12.4 Properties of the Wrong Kind
12.5 The Significance of Reasons for Reduction
12.6 Reducing Reasons
13. Simple Realism
13.1 Simple Normative Realism
13.2 Objections to Irreducible Normativity
13.3 Nonnatural Properties
13.4 The Metaphysics of Morals
14. Moral Realism
14.1 Answering the Moral Skeptic
14.2 Systematic Moral Theory
Notes
References
Index
A Note to the Reader
Introduction
1. What Would Morality Need to Be?
1.1 Job Descriptions
1.2 Possible Elements
1.3 Satisfying the Job Description
2. Basic Positions in Metaethics
2.1 Cognitivism vs. Noncognitivism
2.2 Nihilism vs. Moral Realism
2.3 Varieties of Moral Realism
2.4 Moral Skepticism
3. Nihilism
3.1 The Nature of Nihilism
3.2 The Case for Nihilism
3.3 Disregarding the Arguments
3.4 Normative Nihilism
4. Noncognitivism
4.1 The Nature of Noncognitivism
4.2 The Case for Noncognitivism
4.3 Objections to Noncognitivism
5. Disagreement
5.1 The Argument from Disagreement
5.2 The Implications of Disagreement
5.3 Explaining Moral Disagreement
5.4 Nonconvergence
6. Relativism
6.1 Moral Relativism
6.2 Clarifying Relativism
6.3 Arguing for Relativism
6.4 Relativized Foundational Theories
7. Knowledge
7.1 The Analogy to Observation
7.2 Appearances
7.3 Dismissing Moral Intuitions
7.4 Reliability
7.5 Intuitionism
8. Evolution
8.1 The Argument from Evolution
8.2 A Second Try
8.3 Truth and Advantage in Ethics
8.4 Common Ground
8.5 The Continuity Problem
8.6 Path Dependence
9. Explanation
9.1 A Metaphysical Test
9.2 Explaining Empirical Facts
9.3 Reduction and Explanation
9.4 The Normative Aspect of Moral Facts
9.5 The Unrestricted Test
10. Motivation
10.1 Motive Internalism
10.2 An Argument for Noncognitivism
10.3 Rejecting Motive Internalism
10.4 Rejecting the Humean Theory of Motivation
10.5 The Direction of Fit
11. Reasons
11.1 Reasons Internalism
11.2 Reasons
11.3 Refining the Argument
11.4 Hypothetical Reasons
11.5 Rational Support
11.6 Categorical Reasons and Motivation
12. Reductionism
12.1 The Appeal of Reductionism
12.2 The Nature of Reduction
12.3 The Open Question Argument
12.4 Properties of the Wrong Kind
12.5 The Significance of Reasons for Reduction
12.6 Reducing Reasons
13. Simple Realism
13.1 Simple Normative Realism
13.2 Objections to Irreducible Normativity
13.3 Nonnatural Properties
13.4 The Metaphysics of Morals
14. Moral Realism
14.1 Answering the Moral Skeptic
14.2 Systematic Moral Theory
Notes
References
Index
Este título pertence ao(s) assunto(s) indicados(s). Para ver outros títulos clique no assunto desejado.
Acknowledgments
A Note to the Reader
Introduction
1. What Would Morality Need to Be?
1.1 Job Descriptions
1.2 Possible Elements
1.3 Satisfying the Job Description
2. Basic Positions in Metaethics
2.1 Cognitivism vs. Noncognitivism
2.2 Nihilism vs. Moral Realism
2.3 Varieties of Moral Realism
2.4 Moral Skepticism
3. Nihilism
3.1 The Nature of Nihilism
3.2 The Case for Nihilism
3.3 Disregarding the Arguments
3.4 Normative Nihilism
4. Noncognitivism
4.1 The Nature of Noncognitivism
4.2 The Case for Noncognitivism
4.3 Objections to Noncognitivism
5. Disagreement
5.1 The Argument from Disagreement
5.2 The Implications of Disagreement
5.3 Explaining Moral Disagreement
5.4 Nonconvergence
6. Relativism
6.1 Moral Relativism
6.2 Clarifying Relativism
6.3 Arguing for Relativism
6.4 Relativized Foundational Theories
7. Knowledge
7.1 The Analogy to Observation
7.2 Appearances
7.3 Dismissing Moral Intuitions
7.4 Reliability
7.5 Intuitionism
8. Evolution
8.1 The Argument from Evolution
8.2 A Second Try
8.3 Truth and Advantage in Ethics
8.4 Common Ground
8.5 The Continuity Problem
8.6 Path Dependence
9. Explanation
9.1 A Metaphysical Test
9.2 Explaining Empirical Facts
9.3 Reduction and Explanation
9.4 The Normative Aspect of Moral Facts
9.5 The Unrestricted Test
10. Motivation
10.1 Motive Internalism
10.2 An Argument for Noncognitivism
10.3 Rejecting Motive Internalism
10.4 Rejecting the Humean Theory of Motivation
10.5 The Direction of Fit
11. Reasons
11.1 Reasons Internalism
11.2 Reasons
11.3 Refining the Argument
11.4 Hypothetical Reasons
11.5 Rational Support
11.6 Categorical Reasons and Motivation
12. Reductionism
12.1 The Appeal of Reductionism
12.2 The Nature of Reduction
12.3 The Open Question Argument
12.4 Properties of the Wrong Kind
12.5 The Significance of Reasons for Reduction
12.6 Reducing Reasons
13. Simple Realism
13.1 Simple Normative Realism
13.2 Objections to Irreducible Normativity
13.3 Nonnatural Properties
13.4 The Metaphysics of Morals
14. Moral Realism
14.1 Answering the Moral Skeptic
14.2 Systematic Moral Theory
Notes
References
Index
A Note to the Reader
Introduction
1. What Would Morality Need to Be?
1.1 Job Descriptions
1.2 Possible Elements
1.3 Satisfying the Job Description
2. Basic Positions in Metaethics
2.1 Cognitivism vs. Noncognitivism
2.2 Nihilism vs. Moral Realism
2.3 Varieties of Moral Realism
2.4 Moral Skepticism
3. Nihilism
3.1 The Nature of Nihilism
3.2 The Case for Nihilism
3.3 Disregarding the Arguments
3.4 Normative Nihilism
4. Noncognitivism
4.1 The Nature of Noncognitivism
4.2 The Case for Noncognitivism
4.3 Objections to Noncognitivism
5. Disagreement
5.1 The Argument from Disagreement
5.2 The Implications of Disagreement
5.3 Explaining Moral Disagreement
5.4 Nonconvergence
6. Relativism
6.1 Moral Relativism
6.2 Clarifying Relativism
6.3 Arguing for Relativism
6.4 Relativized Foundational Theories
7. Knowledge
7.1 The Analogy to Observation
7.2 Appearances
7.3 Dismissing Moral Intuitions
7.4 Reliability
7.5 Intuitionism
8. Evolution
8.1 The Argument from Evolution
8.2 A Second Try
8.3 Truth and Advantage in Ethics
8.4 Common Ground
8.5 The Continuity Problem
8.6 Path Dependence
9. Explanation
9.1 A Metaphysical Test
9.2 Explaining Empirical Facts
9.3 Reduction and Explanation
9.4 The Normative Aspect of Moral Facts
9.5 The Unrestricted Test
10. Motivation
10.1 Motive Internalism
10.2 An Argument for Noncognitivism
10.3 Rejecting Motive Internalism
10.4 Rejecting the Humean Theory of Motivation
10.5 The Direction of Fit
11. Reasons
11.1 Reasons Internalism
11.2 Reasons
11.3 Refining the Argument
11.4 Hypothetical Reasons
11.5 Rational Support
11.6 Categorical Reasons and Motivation
12. Reductionism
12.1 The Appeal of Reductionism
12.2 The Nature of Reduction
12.3 The Open Question Argument
12.4 Properties of the Wrong Kind
12.5 The Significance of Reasons for Reduction
12.6 Reducing Reasons
13. Simple Realism
13.1 Simple Normative Realism
13.2 Objections to Irreducible Normativity
13.3 Nonnatural Properties
13.4 The Metaphysics of Morals
14. Moral Realism
14.1 Answering the Moral Skeptic
14.2 Systematic Moral Theory
Notes
References
Index
Este título pertence ao(s) assunto(s) indicados(s). Para ver outros títulos clique no assunto desejado.
